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Abstract
This paper examines reproduction of marginality evident in fisheries. Uneven relations are widespread across geogra-
phy and scale; between distant water fishing nations and coastal developing countries; between fishers on large-scale
trawlers and smaller boats; between local elites and peasant operators; and between boat owners and crews working in
poor and slave-like conditions. With inequality and social exclusion being such a pervasive phenomenon, we ask why
do these relationships persist? Using governability, developed within the interactive governance approach, as an
overarching basis for interpreting this issue, the purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the possibility that marginality
is not only a feature of ungovernability but might also occur in a highly governable system. To advance this insight,
we apply theoretical tools associated with Marxist-Gramscian political ecology to the case of small-scale fisher
exclusion brought on by the implementation of an individual transferable quota system in New Zealand’s commercial
fishery. In particular, we identify social and economic relations that give rise to an accentuated capitalist structure
whereby the quota-owning sector of the population (e.g., processing companies and Maori tribal organizations) control
the ways in which fishers access economic benefits from their labor. Over the years, the quota system has gained
acceptance as a resource management strategy, an intervention that is now ideologically hard to break away. The result
is the reproduction of fishers’ exclusion, which contributes to a governable fishery, rather than an ungovernable one.
This understanding casts a critical note on what we mean by governability, directing our attention to the ethical
questions regarding how fisheries are to be governed and the risks that come with its pursuit.
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Introduction
Regrettably, conditions of marginality1 abound in the world of
fisheries. With millionaire riches held by a select few, lop-
sided relations are widespread across geography and scale.
Recent global estimates by Pauly and Zeller (2016) and
Schuhbauer et al. (2017) suggest that only 4% of the fishers
are responsible for 76% of the world’s fish catches, and re-
ceive 84% of all fisheries subsidies. Inequitable access agree-
ments between distant water fleets of developed countries and
domestic coastal fleets have been documented inWest African
nations (Kaczynski and Fluharty 2002; Alder and Sumaila
1 We use the definition of marginality as a state or process of social exclusion
that emerges at the individual or group level on multiple interrelated dimen-
sions: material deprivation, insufficient access to social rights, limited political
participation and a lack of cultural integration (Jehoel-Gijsbers and Vrooman
2007; Scholtens 2016).
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2004) and tuna fisheries in the Central and Western Pacific
(Schurman 1998). Sectorally, policy and funding support has
skewed towards large-scale fishing operations associated with
vertical integration and technically advanced fishing and nav-
igation gear, leaving small-scale fishers to fend for their eco-
nomic, cultural, and political rights (Jacquet and Pauly 2008;
Chuenpagdee 2011; Mills et al. 2011; Johnson et al. 2018).
Between 2007 and 2012, the 16 biggest transnational fishing
companies almost doubled their revenue, Billustrating the on-
going consolidation process within the global network of sea-
food production^ (Österblom et al. 2015, p.5). Moreover,
acutely abominable situations of marginality that inflict inhu-
mane and slavery-like conditions on onboard crew members
have been recently described as occurring within specific fish-
ing industries and individual enterprises (Chantavanich et al.
2016; Ratner et al. 2014; Marschke and Vandergeest 2016;
Simmons and Stringer 2014).
Such conditions of inequity and exclusion are, however,
not a new or isolated phenomenon; they have been persisting
over time despite some efforts to mitigate these dynamics
from those entrusted to govern fisheries. Others have argued
that these conditions are also observed from implementing
broader sustainability aims such as the Agenda 21 or the
Sustainable Development Goals (Rasanathan and Diaz 2016;
Oestreich 2018). This paper focuses on the pervasive issue of
how and why the interventions to govern fisheries can fail to
address a reproduction of marginality and even work to re-
entrench it. We argue that the persistence of marginality is not
only the hallmark of an ungovernable system characterized
with volatility, low capacity, or undemocratic or poorly delib-
erated governing ideals (Jentoft and Chuenpagdee 2015), but
that it can also arise in systems considered governable.
Further, we consider the possibility that one of the ways in
which governing interventions can work is actually by rein-
forcing marginality. That is, to maintain differences and divi-
sions to allow some groups to benefit at the expense of others
(arguably, without malicious intent). We explore New
Zealand’s individual transferable quota (ITQ) system, a case
of fisheries privatization, to demonstrate this logic unfolding.
BGovernability^ (Kooiman 2003) is an emerging concept:
thinking about a fishery, a population, or a society in terms of
how governable it is or how governable it can be, provides an
intriguing notion that can potentially generate innovative
ways to approach the way we govern. The following section
describes governability and an accompanying perspective
named interactive governance to present a conceptual scaf-
folding within which to situate the analysis of marginality.
We then draw on Marxist-Gramscian political ecology to re-
veal the creation of differing economic incentives that rein-
force separations of quota holders from non-quota-owning
fishers, and why this relative marginalization perpetuates
and is difficult for governors to amend (BMarginalization of
Māori fishers under New Zealand’s ITQ system^ section). We
further unpack the case in BMarginalization as the product and
the source of governability^ section by analyzing these dy-
namics in governability terms, to clarify why such a system
would be deemed a governable one. From this, we conclude
by offering a reflection on the role of governability in facili-
tating more ethical and equitable fisheries development.
Understanding the reproduction
of marginality
Interactive governance
The conditions of marginality and exclusion that arise in fish-
eries and other natural resource sectors have been a topic of
keen scholarly inquiry. This issue continues to be debated
from diverse angles. We first focus on interactive governance
theory, which articulates marginality in close connection with
prevailing societal concerns such as social justice, livelihood
needs, and food security (Bavinck et al. 2013; Scholtens
2016). This theory has gained momentum in recent decades
as one of the leading perspectives for framing and analyzing
fisheries governance (Kooiman et al. 2005; Bavinck et al.
2013). Stemming from systems thinking (i.e., socio-cybernet-
ics), public administration, and sociology, this theory is com-
prehensive in its purview to consider governance research
comprising both a normative debate as well as an analytical
exercise, the latter targeted at understanding how, in specific
situations, governance actually works. Normatively, it puts
unique emphasis on Bmeta-governance,^ which refers to a
suite of governance values, images, and principles that implic-
itly or explicitly underlie governing efforts, and on the pro-
cesses with which these meta-elements are articulated, priori-
tized, and negotiated among a group of stakeholders
(Kooiman and Jentoft 2009; Song et al. 2013). It hypothesizes
that if social justice and equality norms arrive out of deliberate
and democratic negotiations that are taken seriously by the
governing group and made explicit to the public, then margin-
al conditions should diminish through ensuing interventions
and policies. For example, scholars promote co-management
as a way to empower weaker parties by giving them a voice
and decision-making privileges, thereby increasing their self-
efficacy (Jentoft 2005, 2007). McGoodwin (2007, 592)
reflected on this humanistic worldview of interactive gover-
nance theory, BOverall the authors seem to assert, almost as a
matter of faith, that if all the participants are adequately en-
lightened as to the larger picture, and fully appreciate every
other participant’s place in the interactive dynamic, over time
they will, through an iterative series of compromises, eventu-
ally and mutually come to the ‘good’ governance that is held
out as the ideal.^
Governability, a concept most prominently established
through interactive governance theory, has also been
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normative in its character. Initially, when a Dutch political
scientist, Jan Kooiman, described governability, he saw it as
the permanent balancing act, or adjustment process, between
governing needs on the one hand and governing capacities on
the other (Kooiman 1993, 2003). Since then, it was taken up
by an interdisciplinary group of scholars, most notably Svein
Jentoft, Maarten Bavinck, and Ratana Chuenpagdee, who
worked to clarify the concept and its application potential.
Jentoft and Chuenpagdee (2015) provide a two-dimensional
characterization of governability that combines Bcapacity^
and Bquality^ and envisages them as two perpendicular axes
in a graph. Capacity refers to the governing system’s (e.g.,
government) ability to respond to the challenges posed by
the systems-to-be-governed (e.g., coastal environment and
fishers), while qualities are the norms and values which guide
governance efforts (e.g., accountability, inclusiveness and hu-
man rights). They propose that neither can be neglected, as
high governability requires Bhigh scores on both axes^ (ibid,
p.21). Accordingly, having high capacity alone does not make
a system governable (e.g., tyrannical government or dictator-
ship). Likewise, noble aspirations of governing actors are in-
sufficient without the resources to bring about tangible out-
come. In addition, there is an implicit (and particularly ratio-
nal) assumption that high governance capacity combined with
decent normative standards will necessarily produce fair
outcomes.
Such a systematic approach to governability suggests that
when marginality concerns continue to be unabated, the
Bquality^ of governing cannot be assured, and the system is
therefore characterized with low governability. Questions,
however, remain as to how this quality aspect would be nego-
tiated and agreed among a group of involved stakeholders.
Also, the thorny question of how to measure the breadth and
the strength of quality has not yet been fully worked out (but
see Chuenpagdee and Jentoft 2013 for Bgovernability assess-
ment framework^). Scholtens (2016) points out that the appli-
cation of interactive governance to fisheries poses something
of a paradox: while virtually all the scholars using the theory
are clearly deeply concerned with the marginalization of the
majority of the world’s small-scale fishers, the conceptual rea-
soning and tools offered are hardly designed to understand the
(re)production of marginality.
Political ecology
The field of political ecology incorporates a growing body of
scholarship that demonstrates how historical inequities be-
tween groups of people continue to shape access to and con-
trol over natural resources (e.g., Blaikie 1985; Peluso 1992;
Peluso and Watts 2001; Robbins 2004; Hetch 2013; Davis
2016). Scholars in the field engage Marxist and Foucaudian
theoretical lineages, among others, to understand how
governing regimes give rise to and reproduce resource users’
exclusion, and the conditions through which such exclusion is
contested or reinforced. Broadly, political ecologists have ad-
vanced robust and politically explicit problem analyses that
highlight contradictions in the rationales informing governing
decisions, particularly in cases when these decisions also dis-
advantage people or natural resources. Here, we present
Marxist-Gramscian theoretical contributions to help under-
stand dynamics effecting marginalization in fisheries.
Karl Marx’s account of the capitalist mode of production
identifies structural incentives for owners of the means of
production to pay workers’ wages below that necessary for
workers to become owners themselves (Marx 1867). Under
unsubsidized conditions in competitive markets, workers,
when paid low wages, hold the potential to enable owners to
accumulate capital by generating Bsurplus value^ within a
commodity, i.e., value beyond that which the owners expend
to produce it. The asset owner needs to capture this surplus
value in order to expand or diversify production practices,
thereby to survive in competitive markets. This incentive for
asset owners to pay low wages perpetuates class differentia-
tions between them and workers. External governing initia-
tives, such as wage labor laws, can alter these incentive struc-
tures, but national governments are largely dis-incentivized to
implement such initiatives when doing so would diminish
national firms’ competitiveness in international markets.
Challenging the notion that capitalist elites assume their po-
sitions through smart economic maneuvering, Marx (1867)
identifies how the exclusion of non-asset holders from
accessing the means of production stem from acts of
Benclosure^ that restrict individuals’ access to their means of
subsistence. They also stem from processes of Bprivatization^
that enable select entities to own and control the commodities,
for instance, through reference to the government’s role as a
legitimate authority to institute exclusivity, as is the case with
private property regimes. In Capital Vol. 1 (1867), Marx de-
scribes how, in the Late Middle Ages, English feudal lords
violently excluded thousands of individuals from land previ-
ously held in common a process he terms Bprimitive
accumulation.^ The transformation of these lands into exclu-
sively owned estates pre-conditioned the development of capi-
talist socio-economic relations, by creating a group of people
marginalized from their means of subsistence who would work
for low wages to survive. David Harvey (2004) re-framed this
process as one of Baccumulation by dispossession,^ to empha-
size how contemporary acts of enclosure and privatization con-
tinue to deepen the nature of capitalist-wage labor social class
divisions and further centralize control over capital in the hands
of a select few. Political ecologists have identified a myriad of
ways these processes proliferate, including through the privat-
ization of fish access rights through the implementation of
transferable fishing quotas (Bodwitch 2017a), the establishment
of conservation areas (Kelly 2011), and the pollution of up-
stream waterways (Perreault 2013).
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A consistent feature of Marxist political ecology is analysis
of Bconcrete^ historical and material conditions to advance
understandings regarding the ways capitalist social relations
emerge and are contested (Ekers et al. 2009; Mann 2009).
Political ecologists’ development of theory by resisting ab-
stractions mirrors the approach to understanding capitalist so-
cial relations employed by Marx himself and further devel-
oped by Antonio Gramsci in his analysis of the rise of fascism
in WWI Italy (Hall 1986). With the aim of informing politics,
Gramsci brought the state and politics into Marxism (Hall
1986). He is best known for his advancement of the concept
of hegemony as a tool to understand why exploitative eco-
nomic relations persist or are contested. Hegemony describes
historically specific, non-teleological relations that give rise to
conditions whereby social groups support governing interven-
tions that are not in their economic interests (Gramsci 1971;
Hall 1986). Hegemonic blocs form when support for intellec-
tual and moral ideologies overcome economic solidarity be-
tween classes. Classes are also Bcross cut^ by other-than-
economic desires, such that class unity can never be assumed
andmust be constructed through Bspecific economic, political,
and ideological practices^ (Hall 1986).
Gramsci and subsequent Gramscian analyses describe how
historical, economic, and symbolic forces link together at par-
ticular moments to give rise to ideological formations that
contest or support inequitable governing regimes (Gramsci
1971; Hall 1986; Li 2007; Mann 2009; Hart 2010). These
ideological formulations inform the terms of the struggle be-
tween the elite and the marginalized, within which resistance
is asserted. Gramsci described how class-based identities op-
erate as ideological formations that unite and divide individ-
uals, to support or contest hegemonic, or normalized,
governing regimes. Scholars since have described how racial-
ized and spatialized differentials also serve to legitimize or
challenge the rule of particular historically contingent hege-
monic blocs (Hall 1986; Hart 2013, 2016). A key aspect of
Gramsci’s concept of hegemony is the way in which hegemo-
ny is never complete. It must continually be produced and can
also be contested. For Gramsci, resistance arises when indi-
viduals from oppressed groups (Borganic intellectuals^) par-
ticipate in a dominant governing system, and in doing so,
identify and communicate contradictions between governing
ideologies and lived experiences (Gramsci 1971; Li 2007). A
recent emphasis on analysis of those being governed in the
governability literature similarly aims to investigate the role of
society in resisting or cohering with particular regimes of rule.
Governability
This paper engages with an emerging interpretation of
governability that attempts to more explicitly incorporate the
notions of power (Johnsen 2017; Song et al. 2018). As with
the previously formulated account of governability (e.g.,
Jentoft and Chuenpagdee 2015), this view still fundamentally
maintains that governability is determined through interac-
tions between the heuristic categories of so-called governing
system (GS) and the system-to-be-governed (SG). Yet, be-
cause of its constructionist outlook drawing on relational on-
tology, what constitutes an (un)governable system is in the
eyes of the beholder and admittedly less clearly definable.
Likewise, what constitutes the governing system and the
system-to-be-governed can also shift, such that an entity can
be a governing system at one point of the analysis and a
system-being-governed at another point depending on its roles
in relation to the specific framing and focus of a narrative.
The particular analytics involved here focus on two recip-
rocal ways in which power manifests between the GS and the
SG. The first addresses the Bgovernmental^ (or Bdefinitional^)
power of the GS on the SG. Governors’ intervention is an
attempt to reconfigure the representation of SG in the world.
The way its identity is presented and its own capability and
goals understood are all what GS aims to influence. This re-
lation goes beyond coercing or incentivizing the SG to do
what the GS wants them to do, to also recognize the GSs’ role
in forming the very objects it tries to govern. Song et al. (2018,
385) writes that Bit is about building a representation of the
reality in ways that suit the intervention desires of the GS with
an ultimate aim of shaping the conduct of target groups ac-
cording to that version of reality.^ In a Gramscian sense, con-
sent of the SG to such efforts must be manufactured.
Governments that fail to enlist compliance, and instead resort
to brute force to enforce a particular governing regime, open
themselves to critique from global audiences as ineffective or
illegitimate (Li 2007).
At the same time, the SG also works to exert power on the
GS by actualizing the GS’s capacity to influence. Consistent
with Bruno Latour (1986)’s exposition of power, in which a
successful command results not from a reservoir of power
accumulated in governors (i.e., how Bpowerful^ they are)
but is made from the actions and wills of those being governed
who actively Btranslate^ the command in many different
ways, it is how the SG interprets, contests, or supports the
GS’s initiative in reflection of its unique logic and goals
(though possibly couched in the larger ideological currents
of the society) which ultimately determines whether an inter-
vention lived up to its intention. Latour (1986, 264) argues:
Bwhen an actor simply has power nothing happens and s/he is
powerless; when, on the other hand, an actor exerts power it is
others who perform the action.^ Because one’s capacity is
something that becomes only evident in the aftermath of
others having conformed, the SG defines whether the GS is
capable or not and in what ways. To strive for governability is
then to pay attention to these reciprocal dynamics and to be
open to the possibility of achieving a provisional stabilization
of the relations among the various actors that symbolize GSs
and SGs. In the following section, we explore the suitability of
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the power-conscious governability framework, alongside
Marxist-Gramscian analytical approaches, as a means to un-
derstanding the reproduction of marginality in New Zealand’s
commercial fisheries.
Marginalization of Māori fishers under New
Zealand’s ITQ system
In 1986, the New Zealand (NZ) government implemented one
of the world’s first comprehensive Individual Transferable
Quota (ITQ) systems as part of a broader national transition
from a socialist to a market-based economy (Larner 1997).
The system was designed by a group of international fishery
biologists and economists to address overfishing and overcap-
italization and to secure sustainable stock biomass
(Sissenwine and Mace 1992). Under the 1986 Fisheries Act,
the NZ government placed a limit on the total amount of fish
caught commercially (total allowable catch), and restricted, or
enclosed, access to the economic benefits from the nations’
fisheries by making a quota right (or derivative thereof) a pre-
requisite for anyone wishing to catch fish to sell. Quota rights
are an exclusive and private entitlement, corresponding to a
percentage of the total allowable commercial catch, which
owners can buy, sell, or lease. Those with surplus capital can
buy others out of the fishery to reduce the size of competing
fishing fleets. In establishing the ITQ system, the NZ govern-
ment allocated quota to boat owners who declared over 80%
of their income from fish sales based on their previous 3 years
of catch histories. This initially excluded small-scale fishers
not reporting their catches to government, including many
Maori, who were based in fisheries they perceived to be
Maori owned—hence, no need or desire to follow reporting
procedures of government (Bodwitch 2017a).
The ITQ systemmade possible subsequent capital accumu-
lation dynamics that further drove individual fishers’ exclu-
sion from fishery access. Processors were initially concerned
that quota ownership would enable fishers to control proces-
sors’ access to fish (Bodwitch 2017b). But with the system
designed with the possibility for non-fishers to own quota,
processors were on the docks, Bcheckbooks in hand^ to pur-
chase quota from fishers (Bodwitch 2017a). Processors with
quota have since then obtained capital to fund additional quota
purchases by hiring fishers without adequate quota and paying
them low percentages of the total sale of the fish. These fishers
are locked into a Bsharecropping^ relationship where they are
contracted to sell caught fish only to the processor from which
they obtained access to quota, and therefore cannot negotiate
prices between processors. Today, few fishers own their own
quota as a result of this accumulation dynamic. Most fishers
access fish through quota owned by one of five major process-
ing companies (some partially or fully Maori-owned), who
control both Maori and non-Maori fishers’ access to the eco-
nomic benefits of their labor.
Accounting for a majority of the nation’s small-scale fish-
ers at the time of ITQ system implementation, and being frus-
trated by the systemic marginalization it precipitated, Maori
groups protested the government’s enclosure and privatization
of fishery access in court (Boast 1999). In 1989, the High
Court sided with Maori representatives to rule that the gov-
ernment’s presumed ownership of the fishing resource, which
was necessary to implement the ITQ system, violated Maori
treaty rights. In the resulting 1992 Fisheries Settlement, the
government allocated 10% of all existing quota and 20% of
new quota to be added to the system to a Maori trust to man-
age on behalf of all Maori. While the 1992 Fisheries
Settlement was celebrated as the extraordinary feat of
redressing historical injustice (Bargh 2016), it also meant
three things. By accepting this offer, Maori representatives
abdicated the government from all historical and future
fisheries-related grievances. It also meant that the ITQ system
is able to forge ahead, as the Māori settlement did not change
(or challenge) the structure of the ITQ system. Lastly, it made
Maori a bonafide actor with a large stake in the ITQ system.
As of 2016, Maori owned almost 50% of the nation’s fishing
quota (Inns 2013). But what about Maori fishers themselves?
Did the reparation that recognized Maori fishing rights actu-
ally help Maori fishers in the business of fishing?
Unfortunately, the answer appears no, as we observe an ongo-
ing exclusion of Maori fishers from obtaining secure fishing
access (see below).
As Bodwitch (2017a) describes, the allocation of quota to a
Maori trust created a new actor in the quota trade scene, for
whom quota consolidation limits did not apply.With quota but
no boats, the trust primarily managed quota as an investment
asset to benefit all Maori over the next 100 years, as per the
terms of the settlement, leasing it to the highest bidder, almost
always a processor, and using the profits to accumulate more
quota. The trust’s quota investment strategy therefore did not
change the ability of the processing companies to control fish-
ers’ access to larger portions of the nation’s fish. Additionally,
in 1996, the government created a derivative of quota, called
ACE (Annual Catch Entitlement; the specific tonnage a quota
right corresponded to) that processors could also lease from
quota owners. This allowed processors to overcome (already
generous) quota consolidation limits, further facilitating their
consolidation and control over fishers’ catches.
Moreover, the government introduced legislation to pro-
hibit commercial fishers (both Maori and non-Maori) from
selling their fish to anyone other than a Licensed Fish
Receiver. The rationale for this regulation was not only to
institute stricter food safety standards, but also to enhance
the government’s ability to monitor fish sales such that all fish
sold in New Zealand is in compliance with the quota system.
These requirements (which include obtaining land and hiring
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only certified engineers and builders to build a processing
facility) also increased the amount of capital one must obtain
to access fish markets, further dampening individual fishers’
ability to compete in the current systemwhile giving vertically
integrated processors a greater leverage (Bodwitch 2017a).
Drawing on Marx’s analytics illuminates that fishers’ ex-
clusion will continue without external or Bradical^ governing
interventions. Those controlling the distribution of capital
from New Zealand’s fisheries, the Bcapitalist class,^ face
market-based imperatives to exploit fishers’ labor. This group
includes both Maori and non-Maori quota owners and proces-
sors leasing quota, who vie against each other for a share of
the fishers’ surplus value (e.g., Quentin and Campling 2018).
In pre-quota years, fishers had control over where the surplus
value from their labor was to be re-invested. Under the quota
system, the quota owner (or leasee) determines where this
value goes. Processors only provide fishers access to ACE
after the fish is landed to the processing plant. The quota
system has enabled processors to control where a fishers’ fish
caught at sea is to be processed and how much the fisher will
be paid, removing the need to compete against other proces-
sors for off-boat fish purchases. Consolidation of the process-
ing sector (Bodwitch 2017a) means that fishers are rarely in a
position to negotiate between processes for ACE leases, which
in turn means that fishers are unable to negotiate between
processors for landing prices. Processors are incentivized to
pay low amounts for fish so that they can use surplus value
generated through the fishers’ labor as capital to outcompete
others for markets, labor, and additional quota purchases.
Fishers rarely have surplus capital to lease their own ACE,
let alone purchase quota. Fishers are thus marginalized in that
their access to commercial fisheries is reliant on their partici-
pation in a wage-labor relationship with an ACE holder.
Since 2004, when the Maori trust devolved the quota asset
to Maori tribal groups called iwi, resistance to fishers’ exclu-
sion has primarily occurred in negotiations between Maori
fishers and tribal leaders. Yet, the possibility for iwi leaders
to address fishers’ exclusion is constrained by the same com-
petitive market pressures that incentivize non-Maori quota
owners to pay fishers low price for fish. Given that the settle-
ment allocated far less quota to tribes than that needed to
sustain the primarily inshore operations Maori fishers partici-
pated in pre-ITQ system implementation, the primary quota
management strategy Maori leaders employ is to lease quota
and use the profits to purchase additional quota. Tribal
leaders’ attempts to devolve quota rights to individual fishers
would theoretically enable the fisher to determine where his/
her surplus value goes, securing fishers’ access to fish and
therefore rectifying exclusion to a certain degree. However,
the contradiction is that this direct allocation would place iwi
in competition with the fisher for his surplus value, needed by
both parties for quota expansion. In short, as the tribal leaders’
handling of quota is subsumed into the samemodus operandi,
they, also, manage quota for capital gain, rather than as a right
to fish. This has unfortunately meant that the quota asset can-
not be managed both to address contemporary fishers’ exclu-
sion and as a long-term investment asset. Quota (and private
property rights more broadly) as a mechanism to raise Maori
well-being is therefore ineffective in addressing contemporary
exclusion, as it is rather geared towards subsidizing families of
those excluded historically from fishing and future fishers as
well as funding iwi-wide social and cultural development ini-
tiatives. FewMaori fishers work as commercial fishers. Those
that do generally rely on an arrangement with ACE-holding
processors to make their fishing a viable livelihood activity.
Marginalization of small-scale fishers—and to a larger ex-
tent, Indigenous struggles for justice—has long remained a
concern within the NZ fisheries (Webster 2002; De Alessi
2012; Bargh 2016; Bodwitch 2017a). However, drawing on
Gramscian accounts of the ways in which ideologies and iden-
tity formations effect how exploitative capitalist economic
relations are contested or reinforced helps illuminate why
large-scale protests to the ITQ system have not occurred for
at least 25 years following the 1992 Maori settlement. The
emphasis on the tribe, iwi, as the responsible entity to address
Maori fishers exclusion, not the government, is reinforced by
a hegemonic framing of the notion that Maori need to Bmove
beyond grievance mode^ in their relationship with the Crown
(Bodwitch 2017b). This notion gains traction not just as a
mechanism to abdicate government responsibility for Maori
issues, but it is also in part a reflection of the financial and
emotional toll that the NZ Treaty settlement process has
entailed (Bodwitch 2017b). Although it is now accepted that
the level of iwi is the primary terrain upon which narratives of
fishers’ exclusion are to be articulated and rectified, tribal
leaders find themselves in a difficult, if not impossible, posi-
tion to do so. Most Maori individuals are genealogically affil-
iated and politically represented by mandated iwi representa-
tives and corporately structured iwi organizations. Hence, trib-
al leaders need to represent the concerns of marginalized fish-
ers to ensure that they are given full opportunities to sustain
their livelihoods from fishing. Despite this, as the authorities
who mainly employ quota for investment purposes to benefit
not only fishers but the tribal population as a whole, their
ability to address fishers’ contemporary and historical exclu-
sion seems severely limited (see Bodwitch 2017a for a
detailed analysis of the extent to which various iwi quota re-
allocation initiatives have succeeded or failed in mitigating
fisher exclusion and processor consolidation).
Marginalization as the product and the source
of governability
In governability terms, we identify that the power of the gov-
ernment tomaintain the ITQ system stems from the creation of
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differing economic incentives within the system-to-be-
governed. This process has resulted in a situation where, col-
lectively, the Btarget group^ consents to the will of the
governing system. Through this consent, an influential minor-
ity of quota owners, who pay levies to government and who
are charged with the authority to govern the nitty-gritty (i.e.,
processing companies, iwi and the Maori trust), maintains the
value of their investment, regardless of whether they are com-
fortable or not with the effects it has on fishers. The govern-
ment intervention of instituting and fine-tuning the ITQ sys-
tem, through a series of decisions and legislations, has suc-
cessfully re-defined what access to fishing embodies (e.g.,
something non-fishers can have Baccess^ to, which can be
traded and leased). The ITQ system has also influenced how
a right holder views him/herself and what one should do with
fishing quota (i.e., a staunch capitalist, or a custodian of
wealth rather than fishing culture or actual fleet operation).
This re-ordering necessarily obviated the possibility of
small-scale fishers (especially Maori) to obtain thriving means
of fishing-based livelihoods, and implicitly portrayed them as
part of a hired labor force detached from their place and craft
who may easily exit the fishery to be more productive else-
where (see Stewart et al. 2006).
Alterations without harming the economic value of the
quota asset—which could occur in the form of a quota
buyback—are politically risky, a process few governments
are likely to implement. The use of government funds for a
reform would not only require acknowledgement of the
flaws of a system that has widely been identified as an
ecological success story (an analysis increasingly
questioned, see McCormack 2007), but it would also upset
the majority of New Zealanders who are not fishers. In the
current policy climate, a discussion about the major over-
haul of the system is something that those involved in the
settlement process for years, who are now experiencing
settlement fatigue, are unlikely to take up.
In a way, the system appears too governable.
Reproduction of marginalization is an ongoing outcome
of this governable system, as much as it is a necessary
element that maintains the division of capitalist classes.
While the ITQ logic is predicated on a stark division
between the right holder and the non-right holder, its
working has produced an even bigger gap, not reduced
it. In the process, the ITQ system has become more firmly
rooted. The regulatory amendments to place Maori small-
scale fishers on a more level playing field have come in
the shape of specific adaptations to ITQ rules, to perpetu-
ate the system. The Māori governing groups as well as
individual fishers have tacitly accepted this status quo.
Together, at the system-level, the current fisheries gover-
nance approximates a stabilization of these particular rela-
tions between the governing bodies and the target groups
(i.e., between the central government and the Maori trust
and iwi, between iwi and processing plants, and between
these groups and individual fishers). The deepening mar-
ginalization that has transpired was, therefore, able to de-
velop because the ITQ system has made the overall fish-
eries system rather governable. This provides the view that
Māori exclusion from fishing is not an entirely unexpected
outcome if we consider the definitional effect of the ITQ
intervention—one that changed economic incentives and
amplified socio-economic differences between those with
quota and those without, as well as between Maori orga-
nizations charged with managing quota to benefit past and
future generations and Maori fishers who have been ex-
cluded in contemporary times.
Conclusions
Much attention has been devoted recently in global policy
circles to address inequality and marginality (e.g.,
Sustainable Development Goals 5, 8 and 10). In this paper,
we engage with the need to go beyond diagnosing the condi-
tions of marginality and towards trying to lay bare the deeper
structural and ideological mechanisms through which margin-
ality is reproduced. Analysis of marginality using theoretical
tools associated with political ecology and governability helps
understand the ongoing exclusion of Maori and non-Maori
fishers in New Zealand’s quota system, how it was made to
persist, and why widespread resistance has not surfaced. New
Zealand’s ITQ system has altered social and economic rela-
tions in the nation’s commercial fisheries, an outcome similar-
ly observed elsewhere in the world where ITQ system has
been instituted (e.g., Denmark since 2007, see Høst 2015;
McCormack 2017). Quota as a private and tradable fish access
right has given rise to an accentuated capitalist structure that
continues to increase the gap between those with quota and
those without, whereby the quota-owning sector of the popu-
lation has control over the ways in which fishers access eco-
nomic benefits from their labor. As an asset that accumulates
wealth, quota has gained acceptance as a resource manage-
ment strategy, and is unlikely to be mitigated without whole-
sale intervention, which will be a politically challenging en-
deavor. We saw that even a thorough redistributive policy that
reallocates access rights to previously excluded groups (e.g.,
1992 Fisheries Settlement) had been unable to address the
marginality of the actual small-scale fishing operator as long
as the same ITQ logic is applied. What is more, it may effec-
tively deepen marginality through its ability to coopt previ-
ously divergent subjects, thus rendering any possible opposi-
tion increasingly obsolete.
That the reproduction of marginality characterizes a gov-
ernable system is an interesting point that we highlight from
this analysis. On the one hand, the New Zealand systemwould
be described as not very governable if an external, objective
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yardstick of equality and social inclusion is applied to assess
the system. Under this explicit normative and Betic^ lens2
(representing a more systematic, principle-based governance
proposition such as interactive governance), the increasing
wealth consolidation by few economically and/or politically
significant entities and the persistence of the barriers that pre-
clude small-scale fishers from securing fishing access would
clearly represent a breakdown of the Bquality^ component. It
follows that transparent, deliberative, and consensual norm-
setting and practice holds the key to a breakthrough in steering
the system towards a more equitable enterprise. On the other
hand, under a different interpretation of governability – one
that prioritizes the structural and ideological as well as Bemic^
elements that can bring coherence to the system, these inter-
actions by way of how GS and SG affect each other, and the
way the interactions overall produce a tentative but stable
representation of the relationships—the system in New
Zealand is arguably a governable one. Despite the existence
of these differing perspectives, we submit that both are useful
renditions that bring issues of marginality closer to how we
govern and how successful we are in doing so. Importantly,
both direct our attention to how we ought to govern and why,
two of the questions vital for charting robust ethics in
fisheries.
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